

Verification of multiple models of a safety-critical motor controller in railway systems

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Verification of a motor controller in signalling systems



Verification of multiple models of a safety-critical motor controller in railway systems

Verification of a motor controller in signalling systems



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Overview of this talk

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х

@Configurations

х

х

@Scenarios

х





Configuration

3

4

5

6

Monitor

Decoder

SelfTest

JustHeartBeat



Component architecture



16x Automata

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PU

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Model = Requirements + Network of Automata

| Config. | State | Trigger | Comp. | Expected | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| $Conf_1$ | ontroller ₁ is ready | decoder receives a left command | $controller_1$ | send a left command within 100ms | | | | | | |
| Conf_2 | | monitor ₁ or reader ₁ fail | $controller_2$ | go to a fallback state within 100ms | | | | | | |
| Conf_3 | | $\operatorname{controller}_1$ fails | $_{\circ}$ controller ₂ | go to a fallback state within 100ms | doSelfTest to[id][STest]! t:=0, gotError:=false startSelfTest[unit][fault/selfTest] id==1 err:Err | error[id][read]? gotError:=true err!=read error[id][err]? | | | | |
| Conf_4 | | \vec{F} controller ₁ receives \vec{F} an error message | $\stackrel{q_1}{\rightarrow}$ controller ₁ | र्ष्ट्र send immediately a stop command to the circuit | CheckHW t>=TSelfTest[id][min] t/<= | ast=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false ≈ error[id][err]? last=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false | | | | |
| Conf_4 | | controller ₁ receives an error message | $encoder_1$ | notify the dashboard within 100ms | doSelfTest=false EndSelfTests errr:Err Test command[id][STOP]! id][start]? C t=0 correfreduce | | | | | |
| Conf_5 d | shboard can nd messages | | full system | never get stuck | to[id][idle]! to[id][start]! to[id][start]! to[id][start]! timit[id]=false err:Err | error[id][err]? last=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false | | | | |
| | | | | t<=TSending[id][max] to[id][moveLeft]! t:=0 command[id][LEFT] MoveLeft | to[id][moveRight] t:=0 t MoveRight to tommand[id][RIG4T] t MovingRight err:Err | error[id][err]? last=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false | | | | |
| | | | | t <= TMove[id][max] action[id][stop]? t=0, canAct[id]=fals Fal ! limit[id] | action[id][stop]? t=0 t=0, canAct[id]=false ! limit[id] command[id][STOP]! | last=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false fail[id][control]? t=0 Fails Fails Faulty | | | | |
| | | | | t<=TSending[id][max] action[id][reset]? t=0 FallBac | err:Err error[id][err]? last=err, t=0,canAct[id]=false |) err:Err error[id][err]? .canAct[id]=false fail[id][control]? | | | | |
| 1 June | 2022)[| Verification of | of multiple mode | ls of a safety-critical motor control | ler in railway systems |) (PU) (8) | | | | |

Examples of Configurations





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Demo: A look into the configurations

| const int | T\$Name | [Ids][Inti | rv] = {{; | \$Min-1,\$ | Max-1},{\$Min | 2,\$Max-2 | <i>}};</i> | | | | | | |
|-----------|---------|------------|-----------|------------|----------------|-----------------|---|-------------|--|------------------|------------------------------|-------------|-------|
| Name | Min-1 | Max-1 | Min-2 | Max-2 | Comment | Feature | s | | | | | | |
| Init | 50 | 50 | 70 | 70 | control: time | COUPINS | <formula>\$Formula<th>nulas comme</th><th>nt>\$Comment<!--</th--><th>comme</th><th>ent><th>></th><th></th></th></th></formula> | nulas comme | nt>\$Comment </th <th>comme</th> <th>ent><th>></th><th></th></th> | comme | ent> <th>></th> <th></th> | > | |
| Check | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | control: max | <query></query> | | | | comme | | ~ | |
| SelfTest | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | time to run | | Formula | Features | while | . V | vnen | wno | |
| SelfTest | 200 | 200 | 200 | 200 | time to run Se | A[] (not | A[] (not deadlock) Dash.StopSce | | Dashboard can | | | full system | |
| | @Glob | | @1.00 | | @TimeBoun | | , | | send | | | | |
| | GIOL | Dai | @L0C | al | enneboun | | (Ct1 Boody 8.8 Dol doc0.8.8 loct | | Controller1 is | Decoder receives | | Circuit | |
| | | | | | | (CLI.NE | | | ready | a GOLEFT | | circuit | |
| | | | | | | Mon1.F | ails> (Ct2.FallBack && M | c FailMon10 | | Monit | or1 fails | Control | ller2 |
| | | | | | | | @Configurations | @Scenarios | s <querie< th=""><th>es></th><th>@Globa</th><th>al</th><th>+</th></querie<> | es> | @Globa | al | + |

| 1 | Conf | iguration | Health | synch" | on SyncDe | Reading | selfte | sting | artwi | shorth | stopA | Small | schi | Sch | Schis | scha | chckOf | childe | codine ChkCof | antri Ch480 | Ch4805 | Hever ChiRos |
|---|-----------------|-----------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|--------|-------|---------------------|--------|-------|-------|---------|-----|-------|--------|--------|-------------|------------------|----------------|--------|--------------|
| 3 | Monito | r | | x | | | | | | | | | | х | | | х | | х | | х | |
| 4 | 4 Decoder | | | | х | | | | | | | | | х | | | х | х | х | | x | |
| 5 | 5 JustHeartBeat | | х | s | | | | | | | | | | | | х | | х | х | х | | |
| 6 | SelfTes | t | | | | х | х |) | x | | х | | | | | х | х | | | | | х |
| | Config | | uratio | ons | @ | @Scenarios | | | <queries></queries> | | | (| @Global | | | @Local | | @TimeBounds | | | @ | DataT |

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- 1. Annotate Uppaal model
- 2. Configure annotations in Excel



3. Intantiate & Verify many configurations





Verification and Validation of Automated Systems' Safety and Security

www.valu3s.eu





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